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This chapter is about the role of aid in a globalised world where the average Ethiopian has 
less to live on in a year than many of the people who read this report will earn in a day. 
 
It sets out a new agenda for global aid – its potential to advance social justice on a global 
scale and underwrite the provision of basic social security for all in an era of globalisation. 
 
Social security and inter country transfers in the interests of human security and 
development are a standard part of the social and economic\architecture of most developed 
countries.  Large-scale, cross-border transfers were possible 60 years ago under the 
Marshall Plan and have been a fundamental plank of the European Union. But the globalised 
economy currently has no provision or mechanism to provide social welfare and protect the 
poorest.  
 
Now, large scale international transfers between richer and poorer countries need to be built 
into the global architecture.  
 
Basic social security is effective in reducing poverty now and enabling inclusive growth and 
development.  
 
Basic social security is affordable – and not just in comparison with the $2 trillion a day 
traded on the financial markets, or the $984b spent on military security in 2002.  The acid 
test is that governments of poor countries are already choosing to spend public funds on 
basic social assistance and noting its effectiveness as a weapon to fight poverty. Very basic 
social assistance could probably be financed with around 2% of Low Income Country GNI – 
between $13b and $26b a year – well within the ambit of 0.7% of donor country GNI. 
 
Poverty, security, social justice and development are indivisible. 
 
Aid has a historic role to play in providing long term, reliable resources to fund the global 
provision of social security.  To do so, it needs to break out of its current mindset and leave 
behind many of its entrenched orthodoxies and procedures. 
   3
Aid is a vital public good; an international resource earmarked to poverty reduction; 
governed by rules which prevent the worst distortions. The quality of aid has improved in the 
last ten years: its focus on poverty eradication is clearer; government ownership is becoming 
more of a reality; commercial interests have declined; the MDGs are high profile political 
targets; there is even a little progress on aid volume. Public and political support for aid has 
been sustained, based on robust, humanitarian commitment. 
 
But aid is spent in a way that makes the most of its comparative advantages. Aid should be 
about basic human rights: enabling all people to achieve at least a basic minimum standard 
of living. Aid must change if it is to fulfil a historic role as the mechanism for ensuring basic 
social/human security in the face of the forces of globalisation which are creating insecurity 
and inequality alongside growth and prosperity. 
 
 
At an international donor seminar on Making Development Work for the Poorest in May 
2004, two Ministers explained what they meant when they said that their aid programmes 
were based on commitment to human rights.  Hilary Benn said that when we all signed up to 
the Millennium Declaration we were signing up to making the right to development a reality 
for everyone “and we meant everyone”.  Hilde Frafjord Johnson, then Norwegian Minister for 
International Development said that human rights and poverty eradication were indivisible 
and allowed for no exceptions. She said that while millions of people have benefited from the 
improved income opportunities and education and health services resulting from policies 
which support both human development and broad based growth, there were none the less 




1.1  Opportunity is not enough – basic social assistance is essential  
 
The aid community appears to have moved on from polarising choices between social 
development (caricatured as unproductive) and growth. It has recognised the importance of 
putting poverty reduction at the centre and as the benchmark of strategies and of investing in 
basic human development particularly health and education, respecting local ownership and 
supporting capacity for good governance which creates an enabling environment for 
development. But that is not enough.  Many poorer citizens are not in a position to take up 
the opportunities that are created by these developments. 
 
Now another step needs to be taken. Spending on poverty alleviation today has to be 
recognised both as an imperative for meeting minimum standards of human rights, and as 
an investment in future prosperity. It is both social assistance and social investment. 
 
The lessons from the cash transfer programmes being implemented by developing country 
governments are clear: there is no trade off between present and future development. 
Without cash transfers poor families would not be able to take up opportunities to invest in 
their own human development and would be unable to break out of the vicious cycles of 
intergenerational poverty.  
 
The same logic applies to countries.  Overcoming poverty is the engine for future growth and 
development.  With rates of return on aid expenditure for basic services of 20% – 25%, 
investment now will both protect the poorest and fuel faster, more inclusive development. 
 
 
1.2  Aid should focus on its strongest card  - money 
   4
Aid is first and foremost a financial flow. But a culture – born out of the need to rationalise 
declining aid budgets - has grown up which values expertise (donors’) and policy change 
(motivated by conditionality) more highly than resources. This results in distortions: the 
finance needed for development is habitually understated; there is more concern about aid 
absorption than the self evident disaster caused by inadequate public expenditure on basic 
services. Currency is given to ideas that suggest reform is an alternative to resources and 
that changing aid modalities (while essential) will compensate for failure to reach even 
interim targets on aid volume. A health system which compiles with every reform condition 
and which is implemented using harmonised donor procedures still won’t deliver public 
health on $ 10 per person a year.   
 
Institutionally, this failure to focus on financial flows has led to a preference for technocratic 
approaches designed to get a quart out of a pint pot rather than to provide enough funding.   
 
Aid has a vital role – not in levering policy, but in enabling services to reach the poorest 
people so that they can invest in their own human capital. For all the talk of empowerment, 
one of the most liberating forces known to humans – cash in hand – has often been 
considered too risky for aid to finance. 
 
1.3  Poverty eradication needs sustained, reliable, adequate international transfers 
from richer to poorer countries and people built into the architecture of 
globalisation. 
 
The MDGs have imparted a sense of urgency into debates about aid. The status quo is a 
global crisis.  Half measures and incremental change are not enough to overcome the scale 
and depth of global poverty. 
 
One of the orthodoxies that needs to be challenged is the application of the idea of 
sustainable development. Sustainable development had an honourable beginning in linking 
poverty and environment, but has since become a mantra: misinterpreted as a legitimate 
reason for failure to fund anything which could not, within five or ten years, be paid for by 
people in poverty themselves.  This approach, which has justified the failure of donors to 
commit to long term recurrent costs support, results in millions of people being forced into 
choices which undermine their future well being and result in sustainable poverty, not 
sustainable development. 
 
Public budgets in the poorest countries need sustained support to deliver basic services 
alongside social assistance and social protection programmes – not just for a year or two, 
but for a generation. Just as within countries and groups of countries such as the EU, the 
long term responsibility to provide basic social assistance and services is seen as an 
ongoing and fundamental part of the architecture – not a short term investment, following 
which people will somehow be able to provide those services for themselves. 
 
Aid needs to finance recurrent expenditure, and not just be predictable but totally reliable. A 
major step in this direction has been taken with the International Finance Facility (IFF) which 




2  Aid in the era of globalisation 
 
2.1  Rationales and motivations for aid and public and political attitudes  
 
Overseas aid has always been a matter of mixed motives and rationales.    5
 
For the public in OECD countries whose taxes provide over $60 billions a year in assistance, 
aid is overwhelmingly seen in moral and humanitarian terms. Polls generally reflect a high 
level of support  for the principle of giving aid – and they show that the public wants aid to be 
spent on basic needs (health, education, water) – and to be spent wherever the need is 
greatest.  
 
Though politicians often present aid as a matter of both altruism and self interest, evidence 
from Canada suggests that people do not look for any payback – they just want to help. 
Despite many media stories questioning aid effectiveness, and the fact that some politicians 
and governments in OECD countries over the last 2 decades have been, at best, lukewarm 
on aid, public support as measured by polls and voluntary giving, has remained fairly steady. 
This, along with voluntary giving, suggests that aid is underpinned by a robust streak of 
humanitarianism and sense of social justice. 
 
Political support for aid is a more mixed picture. The development of the current system of 
overseas aid over the last half century represents a complex mix of altruism, enlightened self 
interest, and pure calculation.  
 
At one level, from the personal commitment of individual politicians to the statements of 
intent enshrined in numerous high level statements, only the most sceptical observer would 
suggest that altruism plays no part in international development cooperation. A more 
balanced view, and one backed by careful analysis of its origins, suggests that despite many 
flaws, the international aid regime does represent one of the few examples of ‘moral vision in 
international politics’ (Lumsdaine, 1993).  
 
But alongside whatever moral value an observer chooses to believe is present in aid, there 
are many other rationales, some of which are explored briefly in box one below.  
 
As the aid endeavour got into its stride 
during the 1950s and 1960s, several 
donors were decolonising, and part of the 
rationale for aid was to facilitate 
independence whilst preserving aspects 
of earlier relationships.    
 
But whilst the practice of international aid 
has always fallen short of the ideal, the 
basic principles underlying ODA – the 
need for international cooperation and 
some resource transfers to reduce 
poverty and promote a degree of equity 
and stability – are more important than 
they were more than half a century ago, 
when Roosevelt linked ‘freedom from 
want’ with ‘freedom from fear’ in his call 




2.2  The contribution of aid 
 
Since the middle of the 20
th Century, the 
global aid system has, despite its flaws, 
made a major contribution to both human 
well-being and international cooperation. Humanitarian interventions have saved millions of 
Box 1: Rationales for aid 
 
Aid programmes are often a combination of different 
rationales and expressions of different parts of the 
national interest – sometimes narrow self interest but 
sometimes about shared human security. Broadly 
speaking, the more political rationales – and those 
associated with official aid - are higher on the list, 
whereas public and NGO rationales are lower down. But 
of course NGOs have their interests and many 
government aid departments are staffed by people 
strongly committed to justice and poverty reduction. 
 
•  Cold war geopolitics  
•  Post colonial links 
•  Export promotion 
•  Enlightened self interest (‘poverty anywhere constitutes a 
danger to prosperity anywhere’) 
1 
•  Global security (from human security to latterly the ‘war on 
terror’) 
•  Addressing basic needs Altruism 
•  Poverty eradication  
•  Humanitarian 
• Solidarity  6
lives, aid investments have helped to boost food output (green revolution), have promoted 
participation and democratic governance, have improved the lives of women and helped 
ensure that millions of children are educated, properly nourished and safe from many simple 
diseases.  
 
These are impressive achievements – the more so because the amount of aid money per 
capita routinely available in developing countries is very small – just over $37 per person per 
year in Mali and Burkina Faso, under $19 in Ethiopia, just $6.3 in Bangladesh.
2 But with 
more than one billion people still in poverty, and aid agencies struggling to keep on track in 
pursuit of the Millennium Development Goals, it is important to look afresh – both at aid as it 
is, and as aid as it could be, (see Box 2 as a key component in efforts to ensure shared 
human well-being and security in a globalised world.)  
 
   7
Three major themes must be brought together in mapping out the future of aid. The first is 
the impact of globalisation. The second is overwhelming evidence that poverty reduction 
and security are two sides of the same coin
6. The third is that a substantially enhanced role 
for aid in promoting global human 
security, does not involve untested ideas 
and mechanisms – only the application 
of existing principles and practice to 
the global economic and social order. 
 
2.3  The role of aid in a globalised 
world 
 
Globalisation of trade, employment, 
finance, and the media, cheap travel, 
migration have increased the linkages 
between people and reduced the 
significance of national boundaries.  
 
Along with many opportunities, 
globalisation has presented challenges 
which cannot be resolved by 
governments acting alone.  
Environmental problems, trafficking of 
drugs, conflict, disputes and instability 
can no longer be confined within national 
borders: these are issues beyond the 
scope of single governments and 
national budgets.   
 
Every day, two million people cross 
international borders. This necessitates a 
global approach to public health. 
Influenza and tuberculosis can easily be 
spread in crowded airport lounges, or by 
passengers after their return home. In 
1992, poliovirus was imported into 




The facts of globalisation may already 
have changed the food people eat, the 
countries their families live in and the 
jobs they do, but mindset/psychological 
reflexes and structures are slow to catch 
up.  
 
Consumers may be happy to purchase 
apples from Africa or trainers from Asia 
rather than more expensive locally 
produced equivalents. But in shifting the 
work from countries where there is a 
degree of social security to countries 
where there may be none, the burden of 
risk may be shifted to people who have 
few safety nets to fall back on. The trade system which enables people to be global 
Box 2: From self doubt to aid as it could be 
 
The theme of aid as it could be needs a few words of 
explanation. Through much of the 1980s and 1990s, aid was 
under attack, financially by governments trying to reduce 
spending, and intellectually from those who misperceived aid as 
being about handouts. As a consequence, the aid community 
became preoccupied with mechanisms to demonstrate its 
impact – evaluations, logical frameworks, feedback loops. All of 
these are useful tools when used in conjunction with, not as a 
substitute for, self confident judgment. But all too often, the 
latter element has been missing.  
 
The aid community during the 1980s and 1990s often seems to 
have taken the line that ‘unless we can prove beyond 
reasonable doubt that aid works – maybe it doesn’t’. This is not 
a standard of scrutiny applied to many other areas of 
government activity – including military spending.   
 
In 2002 US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld told CBS 
News that "According to some estimates we cannot track $2.3 
trillion in transactions." 
3 In 2003 the BBC reported that UK 
Ministry of Defence accounts revealed spending of £118 
millions on a computerised inventory system that was scrapped 
before going into operation and spending of £77 millions on 
radar for the Navy's Sea Harrier jet, which was then taken out of 
service. 
4  Bilateral military spending levels outstrip aid 
spending in all but one OECD donor country – even though 
spending on military projects is often based more on belief and 
ideology than evidence. In June 2004 for example, the US 
Congress rejected Senator Barbara Boxer’s ‘fly before you buy’  
amendment, which would have delayed deployment  of the US 
National Missile Defense system until after it had been 
operationally tested.  Deployment was budgeted to at $3.7 
billion of NMD’s $10.2 billion budget for 2005. 
5 
 
Since 2000, the essential role of aid in addressing the MDGs 
has been recognized. There is a growing recognition that aid 
can deal with problems beyond the capacity of markets. The 
vital role of aid in humanitarian crises and reconstruction is 
widely acknowledged. With the decline in spending reversed, it 
is time to map out a major proactive role for aid: investing in 
broad human security.   8
consumers - buying from wherever in the world they please – is not matched by global 
protection for the workers who are affected by consumer choice. The World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) provides the framework for the trade side of the equation, but there is 
no commensurate system for the social side.  As Pascal Lamy, former EU Trade 
Commissioner said, we need other organisations like the World Health Organisation, the 
International Labour Organisation or environmental organisations to regulate globalisation, if 
we are not to “create an impression that because the WTO system is strong, trade rules 
trump environment, or health or basic social standards".  President Lula of Brazil called for 
the establishment of an Economic and Social Security Council at the UN in 2004 – to bring 
about a fair and just economic order. The EU NGO consortium Concord point out that the 
multilateral trading system can only work for people if trade rights are not allowed to impinge 
on fundamental social rights. A stronger mechanism of global governance is needed to 
create equilibrium between trade, environment, social development, public health and 
human rights. 
 
At a political level, views of budgeting and sustainability are narrow. Governments are 
conditioned to think of expenditure and planning within national borders. Sustainability is 
interpreted in terms of simple cost recovery in the short term. Aid donors generally shy away 
from supporting recurrent costs.  Administrative and accounting procedures based on a 19
th 
century world of nation states, mean that approaches cannot cope with 21
st century realities. 
 
2.4  Poverty reduction and security and growth 
 
That poverty reduction and global security are inextricably linked is not a new idea. 
Arguments are often made about the links between social justice, peace and prosperity. 
Recently those calls have had a new resonance and the time is right to see aid, not just as 
having a generalised role in fighting poverty, but a very specific one in underwriting basic 
human and social security. 
 
In the midst of the Second World War, the Inter-Allied Council in London agreed the aim of 
cooperation for ‘economic and social security’ as well as safety from aggression as the ‘only 
true basis for enduring peace’. The Atlantic Charter signed by Roosevelt and Churchill in 
1942, aimed to secure ‘economic advancement and social security for all’ and the peace 
which would ‘afford assurance that men in all lands may live out their lives in freedom from 
fear and want.’ (Lumsdaine, 1993). 
 
Much more recently, Chancellor Schroeder of Germany rehearsed the same theme: 
‘Today security is less than ever to be achieved by military means, and certainly not by 
military means alone…. (In) a world in which everyone has moved closer together we will not 
achieve security if we allow the fermenting of injustice, oppression and underdevelopment’. 
8 
 
Another leading G8 politician, UK Chancellor Gordon Brown similarly makes the explicit 
linkage between security used in the social and economic sense of human well-being and in 
the sense of security from conflict. 
 
‘Since the tragic events of September 11th we have recognised a profound and pervasive 
truth: that what happens to the poorest citizen in the poorest country can directly affect the 
richest citizen in the richest country and as individuals and nations we are dependent upon 
each other for our security and prosperity. 
9 
 
But Chancellor Brown goes further, underlining the need to move from the responsive use of 
assistance, to the systematic promotion of global human security. 
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‘National safety and global reconstruction are inextricably linked. …. we see the need for a 
new economic leadership - a comprehensive plan that goes beyond temporary relief to 
wholesale economic and social development’. 
 
This clear identity of interest between the richest and poorest individuals in the world, and 
the call for action based on a concept of security and prosperity beyond national boundaries, 
represents a major opportunity for bolder thinking by aid agencies. The MDG strategy may 
halve world poverty by 2015, but if the right to social security is not made a reality, there will 
always be people living in destitution, either because they cannot respond fast enough to 
changing economic circumstances, or because they do not have the assets and capabilities 
to provide themselves with an acceptable standard of living. To pretend that the world is full 
of people who can be entrepreneurs from cradle to grave is delusional: it overlooks those 
who are old, excluded, disabled, disadvantaged by birth. It imagines that everyone is in 
control of their environment. Global human security requires basic social justice. Basic social 
security is a building block for social justice. Why? Firstly, because extreme poverty is 
regarded as an affront. Second, because in the context of the increased inequality caused 
by globalisation, the least that should be done is to secure people from extreme want and 
premature death.  Third, it contributes to global human security because it builds solidarity 
both nationally and, potentially, internationally.  Finally, because it will contribute to overall 
growth and development and poverty reduction as a whole. 
 
Most developed countries already have well developed social security and social investment 
systems – and many developing countries have modest provision. But in global 
economy/unstable world, need for social security and investment to be extended to all. Aid 
agencies already at the forefront of efforts to address poverty (working with governments) 
and ensure that basic rights are extended – also involved in promoting active citizenship and 
accountability for the delivery of basic services. But aid agencies could do much more if they 
were to shift from the mode of donorship to promote, partner and underwrite the 
development of developing country capacity to ensure that social security and social 
investment are available to all.  One of the benefits of this approach, is that it would not have 
to be an alternative to the other goals; it would enhance progress on equity and pro-poor 
growth, governance and social cohesion, coherence and transaction costs and – most 
important of all – poverty reduction.  
 
2.5  Applying existing principles and practice to a global economic and social order 
 
Article 22 of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that “Everyone, as a 
member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realization, 
through national effort and international co-operation and in accordance with the 
organization and resources of each State…” 
Few people would argue that the application of human rights, such as the right to life, and 
freedom from torture or slavery, should vary across national borders.  
So in principle, other internationally accepted rights, including the right to social security and 
an adequate standard of living, both enshrined in the UN Convention on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, should be fulfilled, regardless of where a person lives.  
 
If the idea of a right to social security for all, in the interests of all, is to become a reality, then 
attitudes to financial transfers, conceptions of society and aid procedures, will need to 
change. But what is clear – as subsequent sections of this paper show – is that the 
principles and mechanisms already exist; what is needed is for them to be applied more 
widely. 
   10
 
3  Social welfare, social investment and the role of Aid 
 
3.1  Social security and social investment 
 
The need to move beyond a piecemeal and reactive approach to security and well-being in a 
global context, echoes progressive calls for a more proactive and positive strategy to 
address social issues within some developed countries. 
 
When Great Britain established its welfare state following the Beveridge Report in 1942, the 
emphasis was on ending ‘want, disease, ignorance, squalor and idleness’. To its cost, the 
welfare state in Britain came to be seen by the 1980s, as a defence against the negative – 
as a handout or at best a safety net - rather than an investment. But more recently, ‘Third 
Way’ thinkers have articulated the case for a shift in approach, from a ‘welfare state’ to a 
‘social investment state’ in a positive welfare society (Giddens, 2003, pg.17) 
 
Risk taking is an essential element in an entrepreneurial society. But poor people are often 
reluctant to take risks because they have so little to fall back on - no savings, no welfare 
system. The positive case for the universal provision of social assistance is that it makes it 
possible for many more people to take the risks that may help them to become more 
productive and self reliant. To paraphrase Giddens (2003, pg17), rather than thinking of 
global social welfare we should think of global social investment. The point here is to see 
global social assistance not negatively, simply as a defence against poverty and disease (as 
Beveridge Report did), but as a positive investment in wellbeing and growth.  
 
Social assistance makes people less poor now and in the future. It reaches the poorest, 
protects the vulnerable and safeguards their rights. It is a current investment in productivity 
and growth – removing barriers to risk taking. It is a long term investment in human capital 
which prevents poverty from reproducing itself. 
 
3.2  Aid as a unique resource – How well does it play to its comparative advantage? 
 
Overseas aid is a unique resource – the only international resource specifically earmarked 
for tackling poverty and protected by international rules that limits its misuse or re-direction.  
 
Compared to almost $1.5 trillion this is traded daily on world foreign exchanges,
10 
aid represents a modest flow of funds, less than $70 billions a year. But a
 large number of 
expectations are placed on what these funds can achieve. Leaving aside the things that aid 
is not meant to be doing (winning markets, oiling the diplomatic wheels), aid is expected to 
make a substantial contribution to the following: 
 
•  Poverty reduction – and particularly the achievement of the MDGs  
•  Basic education and public health 
•  Long term development, including infrastructure such as roads, water supply and 
sanitation 
•  Contributing to improved governance (promoting participation, decentralization and 
accountability) 
•  Building capacity for integration into the world economy 
•  Providing emergency response to humanitarian crises 
•  Increasing disaster preparedness 
•  Rehabilitation and reconstruction 
•  Conflict prevention and nation building  
•  Contribution to global security (in the sense of human security as well as tackling the 
underlying causes of instability)   11
 
All this, with aid per capita of less than $20 a year in least developed countries (UNDP, 
2004).   
 
There is no doubt that aid is not adequate to meet the needs outlined in the MDGs (See Box 
below)  and the failure of aid governance to ensure that donors meet their commitments and 
provide predictable long term finance, undermines the effectiveness of the international aid 
regime.  
 
The Zedillo report, prepared for the World Summit on Financing for Development, estimated 
the increased aid resources need to achieve the MDGs at 50b. 
 
This is almost certainly an underestimate and a more realistic figure for the annual additional 
aid resources is between $66b a year and $88b a year.  
 










Revision to Zedillo 
Estimate (higher range) 
$ billions 
Halving poverty and hunger    20  20  20 
Halving the population without 
access to safe drinking water   
0  5   20  
Achieving universal primary 
education  
9 6  6 
Achieve gender equality in 
primary education 
3 3  3 
Achieve a three fourths decline in 
maternal mortality  
No Estimate 
Achieve a two third decline in 
under five mortality  
No estimate 
20 25 
Halting and reversing HIV/AIDS    7-10  7  10 
Providing special assistance to 
AIDS orphans  
No estimate     
Improving the lives of 100 m slum 
dwellers  











A substantial literature exists on the effectiveness of aid, a broad enough literature to enable 
both opponents and supporters of aid to find the evidence they need to support their 
standpoint. Where the objectives of aid interventions are complex and aid funds are being 
used alongside other resources – for example where aid is being pooled in a fund to 
promote government-owned poverty reduction strategies - identifying the particular 
contribution of aid is always going to be difficult. In other cases, (especially delivering basic 
needs) identifying impact on people’s daily well-being – if not proving that they can be 
sustainably lifted out of poverty – is easier. But overall, the weight of opinion and evidence 
suggests that:   12
 
•  Aid works best in good policy environments 
•  Aid can get to places markets can’t 
•  Aid can work where bilateral and governments can’t  
 
The 2002 Least Developed Countries Report summarised recent contributions to the debate 
on aid effectiveness, concluding that ‘The central policy issue is not whether aid works but 
how to make it more effective’ (UNCTAD, 2002). 
 
But aid is about more than money. For the public and for many politicians, aid and 
cooperation are an expression, albeit not very articulate, of justice and solidarity. 
11   
 
Many examples from recent history show the close relationship between extending social 
support and building a society and a sense of identity. So if a desirable part of globalisation 
is developing peoples’ sense of being global citizens – or developing an understanding of 
shared rights, responsibilities and security in an interconnected world, extending and aid 
social assistance is an important part of this process. 
  
 
4  Aid compared to other support and transfer systems 
  
 
4.1  The development of social insurance in Europe and North America 
 
Although underlying attitudes to the provision of welfare vary greatly, no modern developed 
society exists without substantial state provision of social security (Barr, 2004). On average, 
European countries spent 25% GDP on social security in 1990 while North America spent 
1%.  In some cases it is an integral part of the institutions of the state and economy; in 
others it is residual – it comes into play when everything else breaks down. 
 
All economists agree that some basic social welfare is necessary and many argue that it is 
part of an efficient modern economy – that it not only contributes to equity but also to 
efficiency. Even economists who are wholly committed to a market model and political 
scientists who resist all interference by the state accept the need for poverty relief for people 
who are lifetime poor or at risk of destitution. Even in a make-believe world of certainty and 
competitive markets, basic welfare provision would still be necessary (Barr, 2004, pg11).  
 
 
Welfare regimes in developed countries have different objectives – but concerns about 
efficiency, equity and administrative feasibility are common to all of them. There are three 
components that affect policies to support living standards: 
•  Poverty relief – preventing all individuals and households from falling below a 
minimum standard of living 
•  Insurance – against an unexpected or unacceptably large drop in living standards 




Social provision has a long history and follows an interesting pattern. It typically develops 
from community to national levels and from piecemeal and ad hoc relief to a system which 
contributes to national efficiency and has society-wide benefits. Two strong threads running 
through the history of social provision are concern that ‘easy money’ should not be available 
to the undeserving poor, but also that those unable to support themselves should be 
provided for with dignity.   13
 
4.1.1  A chronology of social security in OECD countries
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The first Poor Law legislation in Britain took place in 1388. In 1576 legislation required 
parishes to assume responsibility for their poor: paupers, not able to work, should be cared 
for, and the able-bodied should be given work. By the eighteenth century, food shortages 
and poverty had spread from the unemployed to the employed and various local initiatives 
were started to supplement wages which came under forceful attack on the grounds of moral 
degeneracy (Bentham), excessive population growth (Malthus) and the lowering effect on 
wages, leading to worse poverty (Ricardo).  It was in this context that the Poor Law 
Amendment Act was passed. Even in this environment of relative hostility to social security, 
public provision for orphans, the blind and the disabled was promoted and relief for the able-
bodied and their dependents was provided for – but in a way that left the recipient worse off 
than the employed and which incorporated strong disincentives to seek relief – disincentives 
which were multiplied in the way that the law was applied. 
 
While the earlier forces driving legislation were fears of social disorder and labour shortages, 
by the end of the 19
th century, efficiency and interdependence were more prominent. Social 
investments in education were promoted because they made labour more productive and 
contributed to national economic performance.  Poor public health resulted in cholera 
epidemics affecting the whole population, not just the poor, and led to the establishment of 
duties on local authorities to improve water and sanitation. 
 
In 1908 the Old Age Pension Act introduced a non-contributory pension of UK£0.25 for 
people over 70 with incomes of less than £31 year who had never previously received poor 
relief. This was “a new principle in social policy.  Hitherto relief had been provided from local 
funds and only after a test of destitution. Now…payments were to be made, as a matter of 
right, from national funds…within strict limits of age and means, but with no test of actual 
destitution”.  In 1925 the Widows Orphans and Age Contributory Pensions Action introduced 
the first scheme of national contributory pensions. 
 
Elsewhere there were similar developments. In the 1880s in Germany a broad system of 
social insurance was set up with compulsory contributions and guaranteed benefits – the 
objective of this was consumption smoothing, rather than poverty relief.  In 1898 New 
Zealand introduced non-contributory pensions – which it still has today. By 1908 Denmark, 
Ireland, Austria, Czechoslovakia and Australia had social legislation of some sort. 
 
The Beveridge Report in 1942 which led to the UK National Insurance Act of 1946 was a 
holistic strategy based on three assumptions: family allowances, comprehensive health care 
and full employment. Social insurance would be universal, based on a flat rate compulsory 
contribution, resulting in flat rate pensions, unemployment and disability benefits with 
additional benefits for maternity, widows and orphans. Flat rates were replaced by earnings 
related contributions and earnings related pensions in 1975. 
 
The National Insurance Act was complemented by the National Assistance Act of 1948 
which established a safety net for people not in full time work whose income fell below 
subsistence level.  
 
The pattern in the USA has similarities with European systems, but started much later.  Up 
until 1935 “it was accepted that, except in times of disaster, no able bodied person need be 
without work. Public assistance was regarded as charity, and its receipt generally carried a 
stigma”. What provision existed was local, regional or private – there was no federal system, 
except for federal employees and ad hoc disaster relief.  After crash of 1929, local   14
authorities found themselves unable to meet the costs of relief, making “federal participation 
inevitable”. 
 
In 1935 the Social Security Act established two major insurance schemes and three forms of 
assistance to support state social security systems.  These were contribution-based old age 
benefits, federal assistance to States for the unemployed, Old Age Assistance in the form of 
means tested cash payments.  By 1940 51 jurisdictions offered Old Age Assistance, 43 were 
delivering federal aid to the blind and 42 were providing aid to dependent children (those 
deprived of parental support or case by reason of death, continued absence from home or 
physical incapacity of the parent). 
 
The 1930 Amendment to the Act stressed its welfare objectives and increased eligibility to 
dependents of aged recipients, widows and children of workers and benefits were tied to 
average earnings, not just contributions. Assistance measures applied only to children, older 
people and blind people – the only groups of people who, it was felt, should ever require 
assistance. 
 
This chronology reveals a pattern: from local provision based on extreme need for those who 
are not able bodied, to supplementary systems for those who are employed, to social 
investment in health and education for the national good but largely locally financed, to 
national social insurance. 
 
The responsibility for provision moves over time from very local to regional to national levels; 
discretionary provision, often excluding the able bodied, becomes a system of entitlements 
based on contributions and/or citizenship; fragmented, specific benefits become part of an 
integrated system incorporating children, pensions, unemployment and health and funded by 
progressive taxation.  
 
 
4.1.2  What forces have shaped the development of social security systems in 
industrialised countries?  
 
•  Awareness of poverty and increased solidarity: it is argued that the Second World 
War accelerated progress towards the welfare state. It increased national solidarity in 
the face of the common enemy, raised awareness of social problems and reduced 
social distinctions.  
 
•  Concern about social unrest/wish to resist demands for more radical proposals; 
Germany in 19
th century, USA in 1930s 
 
•  Proactive approaches to public attitudes: in the USA the Social Security Act (and the 
federal support to States to deliver social assistance) brought about public 
acceptance of income support as a permanent institution with some consistency 
across States and Truman introduced a public education programme to garner 
support to the Marshall Plan 
 
•  National efficiency: New Zealand is reported to have introduced its pension in 1908 
partly for reasons of national efficiency, and to weed out inefficient labour 
 
•  Industrialisation, decreasing household size, labour mobility all led to need for 
provision. 
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•  Concern about disincentive effects: will benefits deter people from working and 
saving?  Beveridge argued that main benefits should be above the poverty line (to 
avoid the need for means testing) – but only just (to ensure unemployment was 
genuine). Rules governing unemployment benefits have been changed to minimise 
disincentive effects and the importance of work as “the best form of welfare” or 
“workfare” have had an increasing influence on policy – in contrast to the role of the 
state in providing full employment (for instance under the US 1946 Full Employment 
Act which imposed on the Federal Government the responsibility for maintaining full 
employment). 
 
•  Other benefits – pensions, disability allowances and child benefits - have been driven 
by different forces. Much has been about the method – the extent to which provision 
should be private or state funded; what linkage should be made to prices or earnings; 
what age pensions should start – rather than the objective of provision for security in 
old age and for disability. It is interesting that the fundamental review of income 
transfers in 1985 under Margaret Thatcher set out to privatize all pensions EXCEPT 
the basic pension. 
 
•  Concerns about costs and demographics. The generations reaching their older age 
now, will probably be the largest in proportion to the rest of the population ever and 
the questions of who should bear the burden of provision in old age are high on the 
agenda of most developed economies. However, it is the method that is questioned, 
rather than the need to ensure that older people are provided for. The questions are 
about how much should be underwritten by the state and how much the 
responsibilities of the individual through private schemes and how incentives to save 
can be married with secure minimum levels of state provision. 
 
•  Concern about inflexibility: once started on a path of social security it is hard to turn 
back. For instance the 1935 Social Security Act in the USA concentrated on old age 
insurance, survivor benefits were added in 1939, disablement benefits in 1956, 
health benefits for old and poor people in 1965 - to the point where virtually all 




4.2  What are developing countries doing now to deliver social security? 
 
More than half of the world’s population currently lives without any type of social security 
protection. Levels of GDP devoted to social security in 1990 averaged just 6.4% across Asia 
and 4.3% across Africa (ILO, 2001).  However, there are in fact many initiatives to deliver 
social security – some on a small scale but others which are national.  The history of every 
country’s social security system - developed or developing - has been incremental: starting 
with narrow, closely defined groups which have drawn political attention – veterans or 
widows for instance – and gradually developing into universal systems. 
 
4.2.1  Cash Transfer Schemes 
 
The World Bank defines cash transfers as “the provision of assistance in the form of cash to 
the poor or to those who face a probable risk, in the absence of the transfer, of falling into 
poverty.” In Southern Zambia, a social cash transfer scheme is being piloted in a model 
developed by the Zambian Ministry of Social Affairs with funding support from the German 
Development Agency GTZ.  This provides the 12,000 poorest families in two districts with a 
regular basic income of US $6 per month per household.  This amount is equivalent to the 
price of a 50kg bag of maize, which would enable families to have an extra meal a day. The   16
village community decides through an open, transparent process which families should 
benefit from the scheme (Schubert, 2005).  Scaling up the project to the rest of Zambia 
would involve reaching 200,000 households in extreme poverty and would cost about $20m 
a year – 6% of current ODA to Zambia (Wolter, 2004, p19).  Mozambique also has a cash 
transfer scheme, targeting around 70,000 urban households headed by older, ill or disabled 
people. It costs around $6m a year. The results of the Zambia pilot confirm other experience 




Five countries in sub Saharan Africa have large Scale Social Pension Schemes: Botswana, 
Mauritius, Namibia, Senegal and South Africa.  In Namibia, the regularity and reliability of 
social pension income make it an important source of informal support at times of crisis, 
notably in drought years, when calls on pensioners from relatives and friends for assistance 
with food purchases intensify (Devereux, 2001).  Credit can also be obtained, based on the 
reliable collateral of the transfer and small businesses have been established which rely on 
the business generated by the pensions.  South Africa also has child support grants.  Both 
transfers have a major effect on poverty and according to Case and Deacon (1996), poverty 
headcounts would be 5% higher.  In Latin America, Bolivia has a universal, non-contributory 
cash transfer programme to all citizens over 65.  Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico 
and Uruguay all have tax financed pensions for the poorest older people.   
 
Asia also has a strong provision of pensions.  Sri Lanka introduced a means tested pension 
in 1939 which reaches around 10% of people over 65. The Government of India introduced a 
national social assistance programme in 1995-6 which included means tested pensions.  It 
aims to ensure that social protection is uniformly available through the country in additional 
provision by States – the programme is cash limited but rice is provided for people who are 
eligible but cannot receive the pensions because of cash limits.  The Indian states of Kerala 
and Uttar Pradesh have had state pensions for over 40 years.  Kerala’s social assistance is 
available to around half of the workers in the informal sector (Cornia and Reddy, 1996). In 
Tamil Nadu the programme includes social pensions for old age, agricultural labourers, 
widows, physically handicapped people and survivors, maternity benefits and accident relief.  
About 17% of poor households are covered and evaluation indicates that it is well targeted, 
with low overheads and no problems of moral hazard.
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Bangladesh introduced a pension in 1997-8 for extremely poor, rural people aged over 57.  
The aim is to reach 1 million older people.  Nepal has a universal pension for people over 75 
which, along with the Widows Assistance Programme, covers more than 400,000 people 
(Gorman, 2004). 
 
In 1995 the Vietnamese government introduced Vietnam Social Security which helps to 
maintain people’s living standard and prevent them descending in poverty in old age or 
through illness.  Starting in formal sector, the Vietnamese government has now set the goal 
that half of the population will be covered by this social protection system in 2006.  
 
4.2.3  Social Health Insurance 
 
Increasingly, developing countries are implementing social health insurance programmes.  
The Philippines, Guinea, Senegal, Kenya Chile and Indonesia all have social health 
insurance programmes.
14 Kenya is developing a comprehensive, universal social health 
insurance programme which will ensure that the entire population receives a basic health 
care package which will include clinic based prevention services such as immunizations for 
every child prevention of mother-to-child HIV infection, prevention of malaria in pregnancy, 
treatment for common diseases like malaria, diarrhoea and acute respiratory infections   17
(Kolterman, 2994). Contributions for the poor will be subsidized by the government using 5% 
value added tax revenues. 
 
4.2.4  Employment Generation Schemes 
 
Employment generation schemes in developing countries have sought to tackle some of the 
problems of high unemployment. Among public works programmes, one of the longest 
established schemes is the Maharastra Employment Guarantee Scheme (MEGS) set up in 
1972. In its first year of operation is created enough employment for five million people to 
work full time for a year and even though the wages were very small, the contribution of the 
scheme to village income was reported to be enormous.  It also accounted for 10% of State 
development expenditure (Cornia and Reddy, 1996).  
 
Chile’s Minimum Employment programme in the mid seventies covered 13% of the labour 
force and 40% of the jobless at its height in the 1980s and “appears to have played an 
important role in family survival, despite the low value of the subsidy they provided” at a cost 
of 1.4% of GNP (Cornia and Reddy, 1996). 
 
Botswana’s government responded to emergencies by providing supplementary feeding and 
a Labour Based Relief Programme which, at its peak provided 74000 work places and 
replaced 35% of the income lost by households. The cost was around 2% of GNP (Cornia 
and Reddy, 1996). 
 
4.2.5  Conditional Cash Transfer Schemes 
 
In comparison to the cash transfer schemes mentioned above, conditional cash transfer 
schemes make cash payments to poor people with certain conditions placed upon 
recipients.  In Latin America both Brazil and Mexico are introducing sweeping reforms of 
their cash transfer programmes. The Bolsa Familia Programme will make conditional cash 
transfers of between $17 and $33 a month to families whose monthly per capita income is 
less than $33 – the exact amount will vary with levels of poverty, household size and 
composition. The average family transfer is expected to be around $24 a month.  It sought to 
reach 3.6m families by the end of 2003 and 11.4m by 2006.  
 
One of the most interesting things about the Bolsa Familia programme is the way that it 
integrates social investment and social assistance. Its aims are; 
 
¾  “Reducing poverty today through a direct monetary transfer to poor families  
AND  
¾  Reducing poverty tomorrow by providing incentives and conditions for investments in 
human capital on behalf of beneficiary families”. 
 
This combination has key lessons for the role of aid.  It recognises the importance of broad 
investments in human development (health education etc) and the need for transfers if the 
poor are going to be able to benefit.  The transfers are thus conditional on families complying 
with human development conditions (such as sending their children to school) and the 
programme itself reports that the key to effectiveness is institutional coordination.  “One the 
one hand the provision of quality health and education services is clearly a crucial 
requirement for conditional transfers to work; as such, efforts should be made 
simultaneously to investment in such services.  On the other hand, even if health and 
education services were universally available, Cash transfers would be needed to help 
alleviate common demand side constraints (direct and indirect costs) that prevent poor 
households for using those services.” 
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In Mexico, the Oportunidades Programme – formerly Progresa – also focuses on a 
combination of poverty alleviation and social investment. There is no trade off between 
present and future development; the programme alleviates poverty now and enables families 
– and therefore society as a whole – to break out from the vicious cycles of intergenerational 
transmission of poverty. In practical terms, it means that families no longer take children out 
of school to work as Oportunidades provides parents with the equivalent income providing 
that the children go to school instead.  It helps poor families invest in human capital, in 
particular improving the health, education and nutrition of their children and thus contribution 
to the future prosperity of the country as a whole and alleviating current poverty. 
 
Over 4 million families benefit from the programme which accounts for nearly half of the 
federal anti poverty budget. Oportunidades has also been the subject of external, 
independent evaluation. This has found positive impacts in school enrolment, health clinic 
attendance and nutrition. In education secondary school attendance showed the largest 
impact with an increase of over 20% for girls and 10% for boys.  Children benefiting from 
Oportunidades have a 12% lower incidence of illness than non-Oportunidades children and 
the data also suggest that it has had a large impact on increasing child growth and reducing 
stunting. “Behrman and Hoddinott (2000) report an impact of Oportunidades equivalent to an 
increase of 16% in mean growth rate per year (corresponding to 1cm) for children who 
received treatment between 12 and 36 months.” 
 
The evaluation also found that the conditional cash transfer programme is feasible on a very 
large scale, even within poor isolated areas with few services. 
 
What characterises all these interventions is that they are not a residual activity, designed to 
compensate for collateral damage caused by other economic policies.  They are an integral 
part of the state apparatus to address poverty today and increase prosperity tomorrow.  
They should not be confused with social funds set up in the 1980s and 1990s as safety nets 
to mitigate the effects of adjustment. Those social funds – in contrast to many of the 
programmes noted above – were overwhelmingly donor financed, short term mechanisms to 
finance subprojects with both a social rationale of cushioning the poor from some of the 
effects of adjustment and the political rationale of making macro economic change more 
palatable. 
 
However, evaluations suggest that these social funds have not been able to “offset the 
disequalizing (sic) impact of crises and policy reform.  They may have also inadvertently 
diverted the attention of policy makers from the need to strengthen permanent social security 
systems, both as a means of dealing with endemic deprivation and as a means of 
contending with the sharp social costs imposed by adjustment.” (Cornia and Reddy, 1996).   
 
 
4.3  Global transfers: The Marshall Plan 
 
Perhaps the best known and most often quoted example of large scale international 
transfers to promote reconstruction and development was the post second world war 
European Recovery Plan, otherwise known as the Marshall Plan.
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Between 1948 and 1951 the United States provided over $12.5 billion in aid to 16 European 
countries under the plan. This represented about 1% of North American GDP. In present day 
terms, the Marshall plan was the equivalent of around $75 billion a year – roughly 5 times 




On average, the aid made up about 2.5 percent of the national incomes of the recipient 
countries over the four years. Analysis of shipments provided under the plan shows that 32%   19
was food, fertilisers, and animal feed, with raw materials and semi-finished products 
representing 48.3% of shipments, with just 14.3% being investment items such as machinery 
and vehicles (Kostrzewa et al, 1990). 
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Assessing the impact of the Marshall plan on Europe, like assessing the impact of any aid, is 
very complicated, and judgements vary. Some analysts argue that in the short term, 
Marshall assistance does not seem to have been correlated with economic progress – and 
that it allowed countries to live beyond their means. The UK experienced the slowest growth 
amongst recipients, though it received most aid.
18 Others suggest that in the short term, 
Marshall aid may have been only a ‘qualified success’.  But most observers agree that in the 
long term, the Plan ‘helped to underpin economic and political recovery in Europe’ 




The Marshall Plan was devised ‘not as an act of charity but as a frank recognition that like 
peace, prosperity was indivisible and that to achieve this goal would require new public 
purpose and international cooperation on a massive scale.’ 
20 Like aid strategies today, the 
plan not only had developmental objectives of combating ‘hunger, poverty, desperation and 
chaos’, but also political and governance objectives, including the creation of a western 
European federation. 
 
In July 1947, one month after the plan was announced, a poll showed that 51% of 
Americans had not heard of the Marshall Plan – and a Gallup Poll showed only 13% of the 
public supported the idea.  So the Truman government launched a major public awareness 
campaign to build support for aid to Europe, resulting in widespread public support. 
21 
 
It is worth noting that in the case of Marshall aid, European countries themselves in the form 
of the Paris based Committee of European Economic Cooperation (CEEC) which by April 
1948 became the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), were 
substantially responsible for identifying what was needed and for managing the 
implementation of the assistance. The OEEC became the OECD, and having managed aid 
to Europe, took on the role of monitoring development cooperation as European countries 
moved from being aid recipients to aid donors. 
 
 
4.4  The European Union: redistribution and social transfers across national borders 
 
Right from the outset, financial transfers from richer to poorer countries have been a major 
element in the development of the European Union. These transfers can be seen as falling 
into 3 major categories: transfers between countries who are already members; transfers to 
countries who will shortly join, to help them prepare for accession; transfers to other 
developing countries. 
 
There are several reasons why the EU engages in this substantial and long term 
redistributive action: 
 
•  Building a common market is seen as being in the economic interests of all. But it is 
accepted within the EU that 'effective economic integration demands a reduction in the 
social differences among Europeans'. (McCormick, 2002, pg.156). 
 
•  The architects of the EU have wanted the EU to be clearly seen to have a social, and not 
just an economic dimension. So the 1957 Treaty of Rome, which founded the European 
Community, provided for a community social policy alongside the development of the 
common market. 
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•  Important to building the EU as a political entity has been the idea of promoting cohesion 
– building the idea of a European society within which people can move freely and with a 
European identity. Substantial inequalities are seen as an obstacle to this objective, so 
EU regional policy is quite explicit about redistributing wealth across the national borders 
of member states. 
 
Over the years, through agreements such as the Single European Act (SEA) with its chapter 
V on Economic and Social Cohesion, and the establishment of the Social Charter, the EU 
has taken a series of steps to reduce inequalities between member states and promote 
better standards of living for Europe's poorer regions.  
 
Objective 1 spending assists regions whose development lags behind the EU average - 
where per capita GDP is less than 75% of EU average. These regions not only include less 
populated areas such as parts of Finland, but also overseas territories such as French 
Polynesia, New Caledonia and Aruba.
22 Almost all regions in the new EU member states will 
be eligible for Objective 1 funding. 
 
Objective 2 spending targets regions which are heavily dependent on one source of income 
such as fishing, or which are affected by poverty, decline or crime.  
 
Objective 3 spending aims to promote human development.  
  
Amongst the specific funds established by the EU to address social disparities are the 
following: 
 
•  The European Social Fund (ESF) was established in 1974 to promote full 
employment, better living and working conditions and gender equality. The budget for 
ESF spending between 2000 and 2006 to combat long term unemployment and help 
workers adapt to economic change was €60 billion for the six year period 
(McCormick, 2002, pg15).   
•  The European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), established in 1975, for the 
benefit of underdeveloped areas and inner cities 
•  The Cohesion Fund, which assists member states with GDP below 90% of the EU 
average with areas such as environment and transport. 
 
By 2002, spending on structural funds accounted for over 30% of EC spending. (McCormick 
75). Taken together, the EU structural funds were scheduled to spend €210 billion between 
2000 and 2006 – a very major investment in international redistribution (McCormick, 2002, 
pg127).  
 
Developed nations spend a substantial amount of their GDP redistributing to other parts of 
their population within their boundaries. This ranges from about 15% in the United States to 
35% in Northern European countries.  It is now being argued that “this notion of redistribution 
within national boundaries needs to be taken further on a global scale and needs to be part 
of a system of global governance in which the UN system and its specialized agencies, 
including the World Bank the and IMF, all have contribute to an integrated system of global 
redistribution within the context of larger system of global governance. However, discussion 
and research on issues related to global redistribution is still in a embryonic stage.” (van der 
Hoeven, 2000).   
  
4.4.1 EU  expansion:  redistributing wealth across boundaries 
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On 1
st May 2004 the European Union expanded from 15 to 25 member states with the 
accession of Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, 
Slovakia and Slovenia. 
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This expansion will involve an increase in EU population of almost 100 million – over 20% - 
but also a drop in average EU GDP per capita since GDP per capita in the accession states 
ranged from $5,830 to $21,190, compared to a range from $17,440 to $53,780 within 
existing EU members
24.  When Romania and Bulgaria join the EU, average income per 
capita will fall to $18,000. Assuming Turkey joins the EU within a decade, GDP per capita 
would average $15,000.  
 
But if EU experience to date is a guide to the future, the overall effect will be a major boost to 
overall EU growth and substantial progress by the accession countries towards a gradually 
rising EU average.  A key component of the EU expansion process is a programme of 
financial assistance – both before and after accession – in other words, a major exercise in 
aid and redistribution. 
 
The EU’s 1999 Berlin summit set out how much the new members could expect to receive 
after they joined the Union. In the current budget, which covers 2000-06, the EU has 
earmarked a total of €42.6 billion ($45.96 billion) for new members, of which more than half 
will be paid out through structural funds.  
 
Poland will be the largest recipient, with an inflow of more than €11 billion, followed by the 
Czech Republic and Hungary, with €2 billion to €3 billion each.  The European Commission 
expects that in 2004, the new members will receive transfers amounting to only 1 percent of 
their combined GDP, rising to 1.5 percent by 2006. By comparison, when Greece joined the 
EU it received 3.6%, and almost 2 percent of GDP went to Portugal and Spain.  
 
These percentages of GDP can translate into big contributions in terms of a nation’s 
investment and public spending. EU regional aid to Portugal and Spain over the last 20 
years for example, has financed 5 to 10% of investment and increased the availability of 




In per capita terms, the new members will get between €200 (US$215) and €600 (US$645) 
in 2004-06, compared with the €1,000 to €1,500 per head Greece, Ireland, and Spain 
received during the last budget period. By comparison, aid per capita from OECD donors to 
Sub Saharan African countries in 2002 averaged $26.3.
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The rationale for this redistribution is that it will bring about economic growth and social 
cohesion. Certainly, growth in those countries that have joined the EU has been very 
significant.  
 
4.5  To what extent can the rationale for European Union and Marshall Plan transfers 
be applied to international transfers to fund social insurance to developing 
countries?  
•  Increasingly strong arguments about the linkage between equity, growth and poverty 
reduction and the positive effects of social insurance on growth 
•  The micro and meso level economic impact of transfers – people spending their 
pensions on education, crowding in other good etc 
•  Solidarity – positive effects and attitudes towards some social transfers, particularly 
universal ones based on a clear category of entitlement like old age or childhood. 
•  Extreme and chronic poverty is beyond the scope of opportunity based policies 
alone; social transfers both enable self reliance and alleviate poverty   22
 
So, the rationales for transfers/redistribution and the evidence on the positive effects of 
social insurance for both growth and social cohesion are similar for the EU and developing 
countries. Why therefore should the redistribution not be extended beyond the EU to include 
some developing countries? 
 





The second reason is about the degree of come disparity and cost. 
 
Development orthodoxy suggests that developing countries need to integrate with global 
economy. Evidence from Europe shows that such integration is unlikely whilst there are 
major disparities: gross differences in pay and conditions are ultimately seen as inconsistent 
with a 'continuous and balanced expansion' (McCormick, 2002, pg125) of the economic 
activity which in the long run would promote well-being and security for all. With the 
expansion of the EU from 15 to 25 members in 2004, the differences in wealth across the 
region have become more marked. In 2003 Ireland's per capita GDP was $32,410 whilst that 
of Latvia was $7,730. 
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In response to these income disparities, net payments from the EU budget to new member 
states per year will range from just under 0.5% to almost 4% of accession countries GDP 
over the period 2004 to 2006. Average net receipts for 2004, 2005 and 2006 respectively are 
0.87%, 1.49% and 1.62% of GDP. 
30 Throughout the 1990s, Portugal, Greece and Ireland 
received between 1.5% and 3% of GDP from EU Structural and Cohesion Funds.
31.  
But in developing countries, with much greater disparity with trading partners, the level of 
investment on offer is much lower .Total aid to south and central Asian developing countries 
in 2002 averaged 0.7% of their GNI and aid to developing countries in Sub Saharan Africa 
averaged 3.7%.  
  
It’s clear that the EU has managed to overcome both practical and psychological barriers, so 
as to extend shared social and economic benefits to 450 million people. If the EU can 
overcome national borders in order to ensure minimum social standards, given only weak 
links of identity and geography, there is no reason in principle why it should not regard 
transfers to aid recipients for social protection and investment in the same light. 
 
The EU now stretches 1545 miles (2486 km) 
27 miles from Portugal to Hungary 
(Lisbon to Budapest) and 1531 miles (2464 km) from Helsinki to Athens. It is as 
far from Lisbon to Sofia 28 as from Paris to Dakar in Senegal 2606 miles (4194 
km). It is as far from Dublin to Sicily as it is from Rome to Khartoum 2168 miles 
(3489 km). So why is it logical for social transfers to be the norm between 
peoples within the EU regardless of national borders, whilst social transfers 
across other borders are off the current agenda?  
 
Clearly there are many links within Europe based on shared history and identity. 
But for many British and French people in the 21st Century, there is as much 
shared history and identity with people in Bangladesh or Kampala than Latvia or 
the Slovak Republic. But because of a mindset based on a particular conception 
(an idea of Europe) resources are allocated in a way that does not reflect 
particular need, or many peoples’ ideas of where priorities should lie. 
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As norms on trade, environmental and labour standards are extended beyond national 
boundaries, to be applied regionally and globally, the case for social welfare standards being 
applied only within national frontiers becomes increasingly anachronistic. Within the EU, an 
increasing number of norms are now being extended from 15 to 25 countries and large 
resource transfers make this possible. The same (now widely accepted) principle of 
international standard setting and redistribution could underpin a system for global social 
welfare. 
 
5  What are the costs of basic social security? 
 
The traditional reaction to the idea that poor developing countries could provide some forms 
of social assistance and security has been that it is an unaffordable luxury and off the 
agenda – social assistance for the poorest has been seen as something that must wait until 
countries are better off. This should not be taken at face value.  
 
1.  Statements about unaffordability are often based on assumptions about a high cost 
structure.  Social security can be introduced at any level. Historically it starts with 
benefits for a narrowly defined group of people (veterans over a certain age for 
instance) and then expands.  It does not have to start with high levels of benefit for 
large groups of people neither does it have to structured in a way that commits 
governments to ever increasing shares of GNP. This is important since it is often 
politically difficult for governments to withdraw basic benefits which generate strong 
public support. 
 
2.  Traditionally social assistance has been seen as a cost with no returns, not an 
investment. But examination of the impact of pensions on education spending, care 
for orphans, small scale enterprise and family security shows substantial economic 
and social benefits. Economic impact of transfers at individual, community and 
national level is positive for productivity and growth. The increased security resulting 
from investment in social assistance can support broad based growth, not undermine 
it.  
 
3.  A rights based approach, now espoused by most donors, is not consistent with 
relegating the most vulnerable to the back of the queue. While delivery of universal 
rights is inevitably compromised by resource limitations, it is not axiomatic that the 
poorest and most vulnerable should be the last to receive attention. For people 
whose premature deaths could be averted by basic social assistance there is an 
overwhelming moral argument that says the only acceptable timeframe is one that 
encompasses their lifetime. Irreversible effects of poverty on children – for instance 
of stunting – cannot be dealt with later. 
 
4.  Affordability is a matter of choices and priorities not an externally imposed condition. 
Most governments have chosen to afford military security (at a cost way over that 
needed to provide basic social security for all) but not human security. 
 
There are already social security systems for the very poor operating in poor developing 
countries.  In most developing countries cash transfers are financed from general 
government revenues – no other sources of financing being available. It is clear that 
provision would be greatly enhanced by external finance in countries with a low tax base and 
could be provided, as has been argued in this paper, through aid-based international 
transfers.  
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Estimating what type of social assistance a country can afford means balancing priorities: 
“Social protection is important. Social protection that blows the budget will be ineffective.  A 
budget so stringent that it doesn’t allow social protection is self defeating”.
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Funders have to take into account both present and future liabilities – which will change with 
the demographics for transfers based on childhood or old age. But the future liabilities have 
to be set against prospects for increased economic growth and rising incomes as a result of 
development, and of the economic impact of the social transfer programmes themselves 
(Barrientos and Llyod-Sherlock, 2002). Estimates of lost productivity in India and China due 
to stunting, iron deficiency anaemia and iodine deficiency amount to around 2% of GDP a 
year
33 - social assistance is one mechanism to address that problem and mitigate those 
costs.  Similarly, Food for Education programmes in Bangladesh and Mexico have both 
resulted in parents keeping children out of the labour force for longer, and increased their 
participation in education (Chronic Poverty Report, 2004-05).  
 
A clear demonstration that there is fiscal space available for social transfers is the existence 
of  more costly social security systems, geared to high level benefits for better off (though 
often still poor) people. Some countries have very generous pension provision within a 
contributory system. In pre-1999 in Brazil for instance, only five years of contributions were 
required for a pension of 70% of final salary for people over 60 or 65 (Schwarz, 2003). This 
sort of example has been misused in the past, to suggest that universal pensions or benefits 
would be unaffordable because of the existing cost structure. In fact what they demonstrate 
is the fiscal space for social assistance, and the political weakness of those who need it.  In 
India for instance, doubling the national old age pension for the entire population could be 
achieved for the cost of the government contribution to the Employee Pension Scheme, 
which benefits just 6% of the formal sector employees.
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Social security systems have to start some where – and they typically develop from ad hoc 
provision to a coherent system
35. Countries can choose the cost structure that is feasible for 
them, taking into account both the cost (and gains) to the public purse, the international 
resources and the economic and social benefits that can be expected to derive from social 
assistance.  For instance, the costs of providing a universal, non-contributory pension of 
40% of GDP per capita to everyone over 75 years would be around 0.3% – 0.4% of GDP in 
most African countries, something that would be “affordable in most [developing] countries at 
least in the medium term” (Schwarz, 2003). Other studies have concluded that expenditure 
of around 1- 2% of GDP would result in universal provision for at least the oldest-old. In 
Nepal, 80% coverage has been achieved for the old age pension, within six years of start up, 
despite the physical difficulties of delivering social assistance there. The value of the monthly 
pension has been increased from US$1.41 to US$2.12 and the number of beneficiaries has 
grown considerably.
36 Even this tiny pension has effects on welfare and productivity.   
 
Measuring the benefits is as important as measuring the costs. Many of the poorest people 
are dependent on the physical labour, and therefore the health, of one breadwinner for their 
livelihood. Investment in social assistance for the poorest is likely to be spent on health. At 
an individual level, this may mean the difference between life and death, or between 
destitution and self reliance. At a national level, it brings big returns.  As the Commission on 
Macro Economics and Health has pointed out, the benefits from investing in public health 
show a very strong rate of return: suggesting that the direct economic return would be on a 
ratio of about 5:1 based on saved disability-adjusted life years: “…economic growth would 
also accelerate and thereby the saved DALYs would help to break the poverty trap…..; this 
would add tens of hundreds of billions of dollars more per year through increased per capita 
income” (WHO, 2004).  
 
The other side of the equation is the cost of doing nothing. 
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At one level, the cost of doing nothing will result in continued poverty and increased 
insecurity for poor people themselves. Stunting for instance affects more than 90 million 
children in developing countries, and its impact will be felt into the next generation through 
reduced physical and mental health, mortality and morbidity. 
 
Increased poverty and inequality – bad in themselves – will fuel the forces that cause social 
unrest and conflict, affecting the security of all. 
 
Negative effects on growth and productivity will be enhanced. Without any insurance against 
risk and shocks caused by natural disasters or trading changes poverty will be exacerbated. 
Five case studies collected for an IMF report identified the impact on shocks on GDP growth 
as follows: Cambodia (drought/flood 1994) less than 1%; Zimbabwe (drought, 1992) 8.5%; 
Mali (export price shock, 1992–93) 1.8 % per year; Uganda (export price shock, 1987–92) 
3.5 % per year for six years; Honduras (hurricane, 1987–92) 13,700 people dead or missing 
and direct damages 47% of 1997 GDP (IMF, 2003) . 
 
5.1  Supporting basic social security from aid 
 
Supporting basic social security is not an alternative to investment in other human capital 
and development – they go hand in hand. Progress is needed on both basic social security 
AND the social investments needed to deliver the MDGs.  
 
As has been argued above, developing country governments are already investing public 
revenues in social insurance and social assistance. The costs of the system can be geared 
to what can be afforded but what donors should be aiming for is to finance around 1 - 2 % of 
Low Income Country GNI - between 13b and 26b a year. 
 
The key question is therefore, what fiscal space is there for developed countries to find new 
resources? There are five areas which clearly demonstrate the capacity to both meet the 
MDG costs and finance basic social security. These are: 
 
1.  Meeting ODA commitments to 0.7%, including progress via the International Finance 
Facility 
2.  Review of government priorities towards military spending  
3.  Agricultural and other subsidy reform 
4.  Consumer expenditure/global taxation  
5. Aid  Reform 
 
5.1.1  Meeting ODA commitments to 0.7% 
 
Leaving aside the governance imperative of developed countries standing by their publicly 
stated international commitments, meeting ODA commitments in G7 countries is not an 
impossible mountain to climb.  The share of public expenditure going to aid in G7 countries 
is less than 1% - for Italy and the US it is 0.3% and 0.4% respectively – even for those 
countries who have achieved 0.7%, the share of public expenditure is less than 2%.  
 
The OECD projected economic growth for every DAC donor country in 2004. This growth will 
generate nearly $900 billion in DAC donor countries. Fourteen percent of the INCREASE in 
wealth in donor countries would achieve the 0.7% target – in per capita terms, each person 
in donor countries will be better off by $1035 a year and of that $145 would finance 0.7%.  
 
The urgent need to find additional resources prior to 2015 in the face of year-on-year failure 
to meet ODA targets, has resulted in a lot of discussion on different ways of raising money –   26
including the Tobin Tax and the proposal for an International Finance Facility to frontload aid 
spending. 
 
The IFF would take increases in aid pledged at FfD Monterrey, and use this additional $16 
billion to back the issue of AAA Bonds, the income from which would raise approximately 
$50 billion for immediate spending in the run up to 2015. If all donors did use FfD increases 
to back the IFF, the effect on spending prior to 2015 would be dramatic. And because the 
IFF funding is targeted on the poorest countries it would mean that disbursements in IDA 
eligible LICs would benefit especially. 
 
5.1.2  Review of government priorities towards military spending  
 
As noted above, aid absorbs a relatively small percentage of public spending even in 
countries who meet the UN 0.7% target. By contrast, military spending takes a far greater 
share of both public spending and national income in most donor countries.  
 
Relatively modest transfers of resources from military to ODA budgets could see the 0.7% 
target met, the MDGs achieved, and universal access to social protection. 
 
Collectively, DAC donors spent $642 billions on the military, almost ten times the $69 billions 
spent on ODA. By far the largest spender was the USA at $417 billions, compared to an aid 
level of $16.2 billions – a ratio of 26:1. All G8 donors devote at least 4 times more spending 
to the military than they spend on ODA. 
 
The question needs to be asked about how fiscal space could be generated to fund global 
human security by reducing even the marginal costs of military expenditure. 
 
5.1.3  Reform of subsidies  
 
Fiscal space for financing basic social security in developing country budgets could be met 
by action on tarrif barriers and subsidies by developed countries. 
 
5.1.4 Consumer  expenditure/global  taxation 
 
A key role of government is not simply to reflect public preferences but to offer leadership in 
shaping public priorities on important issues. To date global political leadership has signally 
failed to strike the right balance, and has paid too much attention to the need for 
consumption-led economic growth and too little attention to issues of equity and the 
fulfilment of basic rights. 
 
Global taxation and trade regimes foster a global culture which results in a “prestige” global 
cosmetics market of around $25 billion and a global pet food market worth $27.5 billion in 
1998 and projected to grow to $40b by 2010. Spending at these levels would comfortably 
fund basic social protection for low income countries but there is an assumption that such 
social protection is likely to be unaffordable whereas no-one questions the long term 
sustainability or desirability of the luxury goods market.  
 
5.1.5  AID REFORM: IMPROVING THE IMPACT OF AID ON POVERTY 
   27
A series of measures could seriously improve the impact of aid on poverty and release funds 
for MDG strategies and basic social security. 
 
ODA is spent on a very wide range of activities. Some ODA spending, such as aid to basic 
social services, directly targets poor people. But large amounts of aid are spent on 
development interventions intended to promote growth or better governance or 
infrastructure, some of which have a long chain of causation between the spending and 
ultimate (presumed) benefit to people in poverty. 
 
At the 1995 Social Summit a proposal was put forward that developing countries should 
allocate 20% of their budgets to basic social services and donors should allocate 20% of 
their aid to these areas.  
 
But a decade on as the graph above on social sectors shows, spending on basic social 
services remains very low. Basic health and basic education for instance both received just 
2% of bilateral ODA commitments in 2003. Total spending on education was 8% and health 
4%. 
 
Another important determinant of aid quality is whether ODA is allocated to the countries 
most in need – the Least Developed Countries and other Low Income Countries. Taken 
overall, only 50% of aid from all donors is known to go to these most needy countries, 
compared with 62% of multilateral ODA.
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Apart from shifting spending priorities, what funds could aid reform release? 
 
A common sense perception of aid is that it is about real transfers of resources – most 
people for instance refer to ‘giving’ aid – not allocations between developed country budget 
heads. But a substantial part of ODA never leaves the donor country; in 2003 this amounted 
to 25% of ODA, or $17.6 billion.  It was made up of transfers between donor government 
departments whereby the aid budget finances student costs imputed to students from 
developing countries and refugees for their first year of residence ($3153 million in 2003); 
tied aid of various kinds ($2104 million); administrative costs ($3524m) and debt relief 
($8710m).   
 
While debt relief is necessary and desirable, it does not result in a transfer of resources. The 
Chair of the DAC noted in his 2003 Development Cooperation Report that much net debt 
relief fails to generate new flows of cash – it generates net ODA by converting previously 
reported non-aid other official or private flows into ODA, and by recording as a new grant the 
sum of interest arrears that should have been paid but have not. Thus overall, around a 
quarter of reported aid disbursements do not result in the transfer of a single dollar to a 
developing country. 
 
Even of the remaining aid, the actual amounts available to developing country governments 
to spend on their own priorities are very limited. Around a fifth of bilateral aid is spent in 
developing countries – including emergency relief. This compares with a quarter in the form 
of technical cooperation – the provision of developed country expertise and know how.  The 
reform of aid, particularly of TC, would release funding to governments to pursue their MDG 
strategies and they could choose, or not, to buy donor country expertise.  
 
It is important that aid reform is seen as an additional resource to finance the MDGs and 
basic social security but it should not be allowed the mask the priority to the substantial 
increase in ODA. 
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6  Conclusion: the case for a more ambitious approach 
 
Aid currently has a wide range of roles, encompassing short term humanitarian action and 
longer term poverty reduction – focused strongly on efforts to halve the proportion of people 
in poverty by 2015. These are major challenges. But efforts to achieve the 2015 goals 
themselves, must not be an excuse to avoid thinking about and planning for a world free 
from poverty beyond 2015 – less than 10 years time. 
 
Over 50 years, a great deal has been learned about development and poverty reduction – 
what can and cannot be done by different actors – poor people themselves, governments, 
the market and non-governmental organisations. The major improvements in human well-
being that have been achieved should be used as a firm foundation for achieving a more 
equitable distribution of the benefits of growth and the elimination of poverty. 
 
The difficulty of identifying the precise role that aid has played, alongside other factors which 
have contributed to growth and poverty reduction, should not inhibit thinking on the role that 
aid can play in the future.
38  The knowledge, expertise and networks developed by aid 
agencies, bilateral, multilateral and non-governmental, should be seen as key elements in 
the effort to ensure that globalisation means security and opportunity for all.  
 
“.. this notion of redistribution within national boundaries needs to be taken further on a 
global scale and needs to be part of a system of global governance in which the UN 
system and its specialized agencies, including the World Bank the and IMF, all have 
contribute to an integrated system of global redistribution within the context of larger 
system of global governance. However, discussion and research on issues related to 
global redistribution is still in an embryonic stage.” (van der Hoeven, 2000) 
 
The challenge to aid organisations here is to think beyond short to medium term timeframes, 
familiar aid instruments and the usual partnerships, to see how aid can play its proper part in 
ensuring basic social security and proper social investment in a globalised world. 
 
6.1  Responsibilities under globalisation should be acknowledged  
 
Everyone acknowledges that there are winners and losers from globalisation. In OECD 
countries, when changing patterns of consumption and production result in job losses and 
other hardship, governments frequently make special provision for assistance over and 
above normal welfare systems. Spending on assistance in such cases is seen as a 
necessary response to shifting economic circumstances. Since such change is inherent in a 
dynamic, growth oriented economy, money spent on protecting people, companies and 
industries from serious adverse effects and on helping people to adapt to the change is often 
seen as a necessary part of the investment in growth. Applying the same logic, governments 
making the case that national barriers to trade and investment should disappear, must also 
accept that the right to social welfare is not bound by national frontiers.  
 
Economic development does not ensure social protection for all – in fact the process of 
economic development often pushes increased risk and insecurity onto the very poorest. 
The right of countries to receive the undoubted benefits of economic globalisation that 
accrue to some (especially to companies and developed countries), are balanced by 
responsibility for social welfare in the global economy. Most developed countries choose to 
have a basic system of benefits – in a globalised economy such benefits can and should be 
available to everyone. Access to basic minimum standards as a universal right should not 
depend on the vagaries of local resource availability. Basic protection is a right which should 
be put in place and in addition, it is in everyone’s interests to create a social investment 
society.   29
 
Under globalisation, the tested systems and rationales for social protection within countries 
(which have resulted in the development of different types of social protection) and between 
countries (structural aid within the EU and the post-war Marshall Plan), need to used to 
develop a global system of security for all. 
 
 
6.2  Poverty and security are linked – social transfers support both objectives 
 
•  Social transfers can reduce poverty effectively both directly and indirectly.  
•  Social transfers can ‘crowd in’ other social ‘goods’ 
•  Social transfers can be positive for equity and growth.  
•  Reduced poverty is linked to global security for all Universal systems of social 
protection, contribute to solidarity within societies and international transfers promote 
global solidarity and human security 
•  The costs and benefits of basic global social security need to be compared with the 
likely returns, dollar for dollar, from massive investments in military security? If all 




6.3  Aid through and beyond 2015: moving from responses to poverty to global 
provision for social security and investment 
 
In recent years, aid has been used to promote greater attention to poverty reduction in the 
context of nationally owned development strategies. In a limited number of situations, such 
strategies have included provision for social assistance (pensions in Nepal, cash transfers 
for households with older people and orphans in Tanzania, child support grant in South 
Africa). But whilst aid agencies are slowly engaging with sector wide investment 
programmes and, in a limited number of situations, providing budget support, in general aid 
donors have not made supporting the development of national welfare systems a priority. 
Indeed the prevailing mood amongst donors has been to give social transfers a wide berth. 
There are several reasons for this: ideological opposition to ‘welfare’; the prevailing 
orthodoxy that welfare provision is inimical to growth; muddled thinking on sustainability. 
 
Realistically, some redistribution is always likely to be a necessary part of shifting global 
economic patterns. Since welfare provision is seen as a permanent and integral part of all 
developed economies, and as national boundaries become increasingly irrelevant for global 
trade, the case for social provision to be addressed only within the national context is open 
to challenge. And all the while, evidence has been building which suggests that an approach 
which helps to ensure comprehensive social protection and investment will in the long run 
effective in ensuring both welfare and broad based growth. 
 
6.3.1  Need for a longer view, and to institutionalize international transfers globally 
 
 
Forms of assistance that were recognisable as international aid have existed for almost a 
century. Over this period, the majority of countries who are presently members of the OECD 
DAC have been aid recipients: France, Germany and the UK amongst others under the   30
Marshall Plan. Spain, Portugal until 1987.
39 Greece was a recipient of DAC aid right through 
to the early 1990s.
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Poland and the Czech Republic, now joining the list of EU donors, were both DAC aid 
recipients during the 1990s. A decade earlier, both countries were aid donors, as part of the 
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) block which in 1983 provided aid 
exceeding $3 billions or 0.2% GNI. This represented 9% of global aid, which averaged $37 
billions over 1983-84. 
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Also in 1983, OPEC countries, particularly Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, provided almost $5 
billions in aid, 0.86% of their GNI and 14% of World Aid. Today a major recipient, Iraq 
provided $823 millions of aid in 1980, 2.12% of its GNI and 2.3% of world aid.
42 India – a low 
income country – is also an aid donor – as long ago as 2002 giving more than $40m to 
Afghanistan. 
 
This reinforces the message that the global economy is not static. In a world which is not on 
track to halve absolute poverty in a decade, let alone eliminate absolute poverty as 
envisaged at the World Social Summit which has its tenth anniversary next year (2005), 
governments should be adapting the global aid system in a way that recognises both 
changing and continuing need for aid. This means seeing aid not as a short term response 
from a small group of countries, but as a potentially critical element in an effort to ensure that 
every individual has a right to basic social protection when necessary, and the basic social 
investments such as education and health that not only underpin human security, but give 
people a degree of choice and the opportunity to earn a living. 
 
For existing donors, this means seeing aid not as a handout to the poorest, but much more 
like the routine investments that OECD countries make in social protection and social 
investment to address social exclusion, increase opportunity, reduce inequality and promote 
cohesion.  
 
This means changes in horizon and procedures. At a political level, views of budgeting and 
sustainability are narrow. Governments are conditioned to think of expenditure and planning 
within national borders. Sustainability is interpreted in terms of simple cost recovery in the 
short term. Aid donors generally shy away from supporting recurrent costs.  Social protection 
is usually the biggest single sector in government expenditure in developed countries, but 
policy towards developing countries has largely ignored issues of social protection and has 
accepted an orthodoxy which turns a narrow interpretation of ‘sustainability’ into a veto on 
consideration of the long term financing of necessary public expenditure unless it can, within 
five or ten years, be paid for by people in poverty themselves. As within developed countries 
and the EU, the long term responsibility to provide basic social assistance and services 
should be seen as an ongoing and fundamental part of the architecture – not a short term 
investment, following which people will somehow be able to provide those services for 
themselves. 
 
Public budgets in the poorest countries need sustained support to deliver basic services 
alongside social assistance and social protection programmes – not just for a year or two, 
but for a generation. Aid needs to finance recurrent expenditure, and not just be predictable 
but totally reliable. A major step in this direction has been taken with the IFF which will 
require donors to make legally binding, 15 year commitments. And progress needs to be 
much faster on addressing the dysfunctional parts of the aid system, releasing resources 
and capacity for social protection focus and providing longer term, predictable ODA. 
 
An approach by aid donors which gave more attention to the issue of social security would fit 
in with, and give greater impetus to, current donor emphasis on developing countries 
themselves managing strategies and implementation. Current trends towards sectoral   31
support should be enhanced in the face of donor ‘bias for short-term, discrete, sectoral, and 
infrastructure programmes, instead of direct support for the development or strengthening of 
social protection programmes’ (Barrientos, 2004). As a minimum, aid policy should ensure 
that it does not stand in the way of the development of basic social security and social 
protection. PRSPs, for instance, should routinely address provision for social protection, who 
is in charge of it, coverage, resource availability compared to need, social and economic 
benefits, plans for extension and reform, management mechanisms and who is involved. 
 
Just as horizons for such action have moved from family, to village, to county, to nation and 
in the case of Europe to a region of 25 nations – so in a global economy it is time to 
envisage a global society. This approach would see aid not simply in terms of money 
expended ‘overseas’ with its connotations of international charity. Rather spending would be 
seen both as a kind of insurance and as an investment in a shared problem. To pursue the 
earlier point on public health, if the object of the exercise is to protect people from a global 
threat such as tuberculosis, it matters little to the person in Aachen or Alabama whether the 
money is spent within state or national or EU or Federal borders – or in Africa, provided that 
the spending tackles the problem. 
6.3.2  Robust public support for aid can underpin ambitious strategy to build global 
human security  
 
Recent analysis of public opinion polls from 13 OECD donor countries, confirms that public 
support for the principle of aid has remained high and stable for two decades. On average, 
over 80% of the public support aid, with support levels across the 13 donor countries ranging 
from 70% to 95%. At the lower end of the scale are New Zealand and the UK at 71% and at 
the higher end are Netherlands at 90% and Ireland at 95%. 
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Large scale voluntary financial support for development NGOs, from the public in OECD 
countries, shows that the public response goes beyond an expression of goodwill. An 
enormous range of voluntary activity, ranging from solidarity groups through direct 
humanitarian aid initiatives, child sponsorship, development education in schools, workplace 
and community linking, reveal a very active and robust public commitment to a universal 
right to basic needs and security.  
 
Aid and cooperation provides the lens through which many people see relations between 
developed and developing countries.  
 
Over the last twenty years, the quality of the image presented both by NGOs and 
governments has changed for the better. NGOs have moved from a charitable approach to 
one based on social justice and rights. Governments are still slowly adapting aid modalities 
‘from donorship to ownership’, and are beginning to address the coherence of cooperation 
with other government policies in areas such as trade, arms exports, agriculture and 
international governance.
44 And perhaps most significant, many ordinary people are 
engaging with the day to day realities of globalisation  through their work or families or travel, 




Both historical evidence and recent experience, shows how the existing bedrock of public 
commitment could be used to build widespread support for financial transfers to ensure 
social security and investment for all. 
 
The 2004 World Development Report explains how in Norway ("the quintessential welfare 
state") welfare provision evolved over two centuries, with private systems gradually giving 
way to state-run institutions. In Norway, making social services available to all was seen as   32
an important part of building a national identity. 
 Right to the present day, transfers to reduce 
inequality and promote development have seen by the EU as vital to promote cohesion and 
a European identity. These examples show how a strategy to promote global social security 
and investment would not only help to  fulfil basic human rights and enhance the prospects 
for broad based growth, but is also important in developing a sense of citizenship and 
responsibility that goes beyond national borders.  
The aid community has talked in a general way about global human security, but here is an 
opportunity to really focus on delivering it. The fact that aid has a vital part to play in ensuring 
global provision of social welfare does not mean that aid or aid donors will fund all global 
social welfare. But role of aid is in promoting, partnering and underwriting basic global social 
protection - an agenda for aid within and beyond the MDGs.   
ILO argues that government plays an ‘indispensable role’ as the ultimate financial guarantor 
of social security. But governments can only play this role when they have adequate 
resources, and for many developing countries, the capacity to ensure the provision of even 
minimal benefits is lacking. Financial globalisation means that employment and pension 
funding are subject to global, not just national influences. And already aid donors and the 
International Financial Institutions are engaged in the support and reform of social security 
systems on a country by country basis. But this piecemeal approach does not ensure for 
everyone, the right to social security enshrined in the UN Convention on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (Barr, 2004).   
 
 
6.4  Global social justice needs more international cooperation – not less 
 
The ‘realist’ theory of international relations, which saw competing states as the dominant 
actors in global relations, dominated thinking for the second half of the 20th Century. But five 
years into the 21st Century, this looks less realistic, and the idea that global society can 
never be more than ‘a society of nation states’ is already looking out of date (McCormick, 
2002). ‘The view that the present political division of humanity is natural and inevitable is 
nonsensical’. 
 
“I believe that the answer is not to retreat from globalisation or global cooperation. Instead 
we must step up our efforts to work together to advance social justice on a global scale, to 
the benefit of all. And we must do this with more international cooperation not less --- 
founded on the belief that not only do we have obligations to each other beyond our front 
doors and garden gates, responsibilities beyond the city wall and duties beyond our national 
borders but that, working together – governments, business, NGOs, faith groups - this 
generation, with its energy, technology and global reach, does indeed have it in its power – if 
it so chooses – to finally free the world from poverty, disease, illiteracy and want." 
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14 Social Health Insurance – Systems of Solidarity. GTZ, Eschborn, Germany, June 2004 
15 After US Secretary of State George Marshall, the architect of the plan, which was announced in an address to 
Harvard on 5 June 1947. 
16http://www.economist.com/research/Economics/alphabetic.cfm?TERM=MARSHALL%20PLAN#MARSHALL%
20PLAN). Other estimates of Marshall aid cover assistance through 1952 and put spending at rather higher figures 
with the cost to the US at anything from $100 to $200 billion. 
http://www.cfr.org/pub6187/rachel_bronson/talk_is_cheap_a_marshall_plan_isnt.php  
17 Roughly two-thirds of Marshall aid went to four countries: nearly one-quarter to Britain, one-fifth to France, and 
roughly one-tenth each to Italy and West Germany. Yet in per capita terms, Norway and Austria were the greatest 
beneficiaries, with Marshall aid worth over $130 per head, compared with $19 for West Germans. The content of the 
assistance varied greatly. Forty percent of ERP imports into Britain was food, fuel, and fertilizer. Food also 
constituted a high proportion of Marshall aid to Germany, Austria, and Ireland, but, across much of continental 
Europe, over 20 percent of the assistance took the form of vehicles, machinery, iron, and steel. In general, food 
became less important after 1949. Countries also varied in the way they used counterpart funds, the receipts of 
national governments from the sale of ERP goods, which Washington wanted earmarked for specific purposes. 
Britain and Norway applied them almost entirely to debt retirement. 
18 http://www.kakanien.ac.at/beitr/fallstudie/TNarozhna1.pdf  
19De Long and Eichengreen say that the Plan significantly sped Western European growth in their paper entitled The 
Marshall Plan: History’s Most Successful Structural Adjustment Program, October 1991 http://www.j-bradford-
delong.net/pdf_files/Marshall_Large.pdf  
20 Gordon Brown http://www.societyandbusiness.gov.uk/pdf/f31brown0103.pdf 




25 http://www.worldbank.org/transitionnewsletter/aprmayjun03/pgs1-8.htm  
26 Aid per capita in 2002 for Nepal was $14.9, Bangladesh $6.3 and Haiti $18.9, Table 18, HDR 2004. 
27 Distances calculated at http://www.indo.com/distance/index.html  
28 1714 miles (2758 km) Lisbon Sofia 
29 http://www.bized.ac.uk/stafsup/options/notes/eu_gdp.htm 
30 Fiscal effects of accession in the new Member States, Martin Hallet, Directorate-General for 
Economic and Financial Affairs ISSN 1725-3187 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/economic_papers/2004/ecp203en.pdf  
31 http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/economic_papers/2004/ecp203en.pdf fig 4, p11. 
32 Nicholas Barr quotes in HelpAge International, ‘Population Ageing and Development – new strategies for social 
protection’ Report of seminar held in Washington DC on 31 October 2002.   34
                                                                                                                                                             
33 Susan Horton, Nutrition and Epidemiological Transitions, Sustainable Food Security for All by 2020, 2020 Vision 
Conference Bonn Germany 2001 
34 HelpAge International, ‘Age and Security: How Social Pensions can deliver effective aid to poor older people and 
their families’, 2004. p 45 
 
36 Rajan, S.I., Old Age Allowance Programmes in Nepal, Conference Paper, Staying Poor, CPRC Manchester 2003 
www.chronicpoverty.org 
37 A number of donors have very large shares of ODA unallocable by income group. 
38 The precise influence of government and market mechanisms can be just as difficult to trace as that of aid. 
39 Portugal received $64 millions in 1987, GDFF 1984-1987, OECD Paris, 1989. 
40 GDFF 1988-1991, OECD Paris, 1993. 
41 DAC Report 1987, OECD, Paris, 1988. 
42 DAC Report 1981, OECD, Paris, 1982. 
43 Public Opinion and the Fight against Poverty, Mc Donnell, Solignac Lecomte and Wegimont, OECD 
Development Centre, Paris, 2003. 
44 Reference to specific DAC steps 
45 A 2003 poll for DFID UK for example showed a rise from 42% to 49% since 2001, in the number of people who 
thought buying fair trade goods was a way in which they could most effectively contribute to poverty reduction. 
Omnibus Poll, Office of National Statistics, London, July 2003. 
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